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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

'

Plaintiff-Respondent, )

vs.
CLARK JAMES RED.FORD,

\ Case No.
\ 12480

Defendant-AppeUant. ,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of
Section 76-30-3 Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), making
' a murder committed in the perpetration of a rape, Murder in the First Degree.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
Appellant was tried in the District Court in and for
, Juab County, the Honorable James P. McCune presiding, and found guilty of Murder in the First Degree.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant prays that the judgment of the lower
Court be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

STATE.MENT OF FACTS
On Friday, October 10, 1969, the victim, Ann Ler.
anger, left her place of employment, the Spanish Fork
Bank, at approximately 6 :15 p.m. to return to her apartment in Provo, Utah. She developed car trouble on the
way and was stopped southbound on Interstate High·
way 15 on the freeway overpass in the vicinity of the
Spanish Fork exit.
Two automobiles were observed stopped in the
parking lane, one of which was identified as belonging
to Ann Levanger by Highway Patrolman Ned Duel, at
6 :45 p.m. on October 10, 1969, and the other car was
later identified as being that of the Appellant.
The victim's body was found 16 days later on Oc·
tober 26, 1969, by one Gary V. Winkle, a school teacher
who was looking for antique bottles in an abandoned
mining town known as Silver City, located in Juab
County ( T 720). One house remains in Silver City which
had last been occupied by the Rowley family, a grand·
mother of Appellant, and the body was found stomach
down with a portion of her clothing around her throai
with a stick inserted. The victim's shoes and purse were
found a short distance from the body.
2

On October 10, 1969, the Appellant was in the
I Stocker Club in the City of Springville, Utah County,
Ner 1
ial., \\'hich City is north of the location where the Levanger
automobile was found. The Appellant was drinking beer
and playing pool in the Stocker Club with Michael Branagan. Michael Branagan was going to Ely, Nevada, to
get married and the Appellant also discussed the possier- bilities of marriage. Branagan and Appellant then agreed
irk to meet in Grant's Lounge, a bar located in Spanish
1rt- Fork, Ctah, at 7:00 p.m. on October 10, 1969.
1
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The Appellant was later sighted on October 10,
1969, at approximate1y 9 :30 p.m. trave1ing west to east
on Highway 50 and 6 in Goshen, Utah, by one Barbara
Branagan in the company of her husband, Michael Branthe agan. The Branagans followed the Appellant's vehicle
ng and Barbara Branagan then got out of her husband's
at car and into Appellant's vehicle in front of the house of
vas I Barbara Branagan's father.
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Barbara Branagan, upon entering the Appellant's
rehicle, observed that Appellant had what appeared to
be a black eye and bruise on the left portion of his face,
mud on his shoes and hands and further testified to mud
on the interior of the Appellant's automobile.
Appellant was in Harold's Club in Provo, Utah,
where he met one Tony Jensen. Appellant left the Stocker Club in Springville to drive to Zale' s Jewelry in Proro, Utah, to buy wedding rings and upon discovering it
lo be dosed, went to Harold's Club where he engaged
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one Tony Jensen and others in a pool game at approxi.
mately 7 :00 p.m. on the evening of October 10, 1969.
Appellant and Tony Jensen left Harold's Club ana
went to the Regal Bowling Lanes, also in Provo, to play
pool. Jensen and Appellant got into a fight over mone;·
owed by Jensen to Appellant and Appellant testified
Jensen threw the cue ball, hitting Appellant in the left
face. Appellant testified the fight continued in the alley
and at its conclusion at or about 7 :30 or 7 :45 p.m., he
left, driving to Reams Bargain Center where he purchased some clothing and then drove to the Sage Inn
where his mother was employed in Springville, Utah. He
talked to his mother for ten minutes and left, driving to
Goshen to pick up Kathy Palmer Wing in order to meet
the Branagans for the wedding trip to Ely, Nevada.
The State's evidence showed the Branagans, Ap·
pellant, and Kathy Palmer Wing left the Twin Pines
Cafe in Goshen, Utah, at approximately 9 :45 or 10:00
p.m. on October IO, 1969, and drove west on Highway
50 and 6 toward Ely, Nevada, arriving in Ely at I :30
to I :45 a.m. on October I I, 1969. Enroute to Ely, the
Appellant had inquired if it was snowing in the general
vicinity of where the body was located. While in Ely,
the Branagans were married, as was Appellant, and Appellant bought a pair of shoes and other personal iterns
for him and his wife. He then threw the old shoes out of
the car window ten miles East of Ely on the return trip.
The disappearance of the victim was on the radio
and television, and was being discussed by the occupants
4

of the vehicle. On the return trip, in the vicinity of Silver
City, the Appellant said, "I did that, didn't we, Mike."
During the course of interrogation in December, 1969,
the Appellant stated to Deputy Sheriff Mark Holley
incriminating statements.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY AD.MI'l'TING EVIDENCE OF A
PRIOR ASSAULT HY APPELLANT UPON A
PERSON OTHER THAN THE VICTIM.
The State, over objection by Appellant, admitted
testimony of one Linda I vie ( T 1319-1341) concerning
an incident which had occurred on October 9, 1969, in
which the Appellant abducted Linda I vie at knife point,
forcing her to walk to Appellant's vehicle at which time
she broke and ran. The State made its first reference to
this incident in the opening statement and it is interesting to note that the State placed great significance on
Linda I vie' s testimony by calling her as a witness immediately prior to resting.
The State's case was and is largely circumstantial.
The identity of the perpetrator of the offense is the only
significantly triable issue. To place Linda I vie' s testimony at the end of the State's case, as opposed to the
beginning when the Perigo ( T 594) and Jackson ( T
6U) witnesses testified was to place greater emphasis
5

upon the nature of the testimony and increase its preju
dicial impact. The State had abandoned identificatior
many days earlier in the trial and Linda Ivie's testimom
was not offered for its limited purpose of identification
but simply to show that Appellant was some kind ol
wicked man who made assaults upon women regularly

Trial counsel objected to .Mrs. Ivie's testimony Ir
entirety in a l\'Iotion to Supress which was overruled am
then requested the trial judge to admonish the jury ol
the limited purpose for which the State was permitte(
to offer the testimony ( T 1317) . The trial judge the1
made the following statement:

... V\Tithe reference to the testimony to be giY
en by the witness Linda I vie, this testimony 1
being admitted by the Court for a limited pur
pose. I think it would be proper for the Court 11
state for your information ... that her testimon:
will undoubtedlp concern another offense or a
alleged unlawful act by the defendant. This i
admitted by the Court only for the purpose o
identity of the defendant and for a method o
operation, as we say in the law, modus operand
or the initial M initial 0 .... Now, I'll state tha
again, that you are to consider the testimony on!
as to the identity of the defendant, his presenc
in the locality, and any method of operation o
action on his part which you may consider fror
the testimony of this witness. In any event, yo
are not to consider this as any proof of anothe
offense and simply for the purpose for which th
Court has stated.

Trial counsel renewed his objection to the testimony c
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Linda I vie in total and excepted to the Court's admonition (T 1318).
The effect of the Court's admonition was to permit
the jury to consider Linda I vie' s testimony for whatever
, they desired and was not limited to identification. Ap, pellant also urges the Court to note that Mrs. I vie' s
testimony, in a very small part, was not restricted to identification but was rather testimony in detail regarding a
separate substantive offense upon a victim not on trial
and went greatly beyond any limitation to identification.

1

1

This type of flagrantly prejudicial testimony can
never be cured by a cautionary instruction as was given.
The general rule in Utah is expressed in State vs.
Pollock, 129 P2d 554 ( 1924) by Justice "\Volfe, speaking for the Court, quoting with approval from State vs.
Morris, 90 Or. 60, 175 P 668, 670, as set out in State vs.
Kappas, 100 Utah 274, 114 P2d 205:

Uj

r

The State's attorney, in closing argument, attempted to draw analogies to this incident and the case for
which the Appellant was being tried by suggesting an
attack by a man by use of force in a lonely place upon an
unsuspecting female ( T 1823-1825).

1

As a general rule, evidence of other crimes is not
admissable; but, where the evidence tends to show
the commission of a system of crimes by unusual
methods, it is admitted.
The eYidence of other crimes, while often relevant
lu show criminal propensities, the relevancy is out-
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weighed by the risks of undue influence on the jury ani
raising collateral issues. Jones vs. Commonwealth, 30,J
Ky 666. Exceptions to this general rule allow in evidenrt
of prior crimes to establish some element of the present
crime charged, as opposed to showing that the defend.
ant had a criminal propensity. People vs. Puente, 28 Cal
2d 306. Utah seems to have taken an absolute position ir1
sex crimes such as Appellant was charged with here.
Evidence of prior sex crimes or bad acts may bt
admissable to show a passion or propensity for illicit sex·
ual relations with the person concerned in the crime on~
trial. Hence, the prior crimes must involve the complain·
ing witness. State vs. Williarns, 36 Utah 273, 103 P 250.
Justice Henroid, speaking for a unanimous Court in
reversing and granting a new trial in State vs. Winget,
6 Utah 2d 243 310 P2d 738, stated:
The sole question confronting us is whether evi·
dence of other similar sex acts with persons other
than the complaining witness is admissable ...
such evidence is inadmissible in this state.
Justice Wade's concurring opinion makes this ob·
servation with his characteristic clarity:
The potential danger that this evidence. woula
cause undue prejudice, confuse the issues, ana
mislead the jury is obvious ... the court abuseo
its discretion inf ailing to exclude this evidence .on
the grounds that the potential danger of preJU·
dice far outweighs its substantive value.

8
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POINT II

THE COURT COMMITTED REYERSIBLE
irt EHROR IK PERMITTING THE DISTRICT
!nl ATTORNEY TO EXCEED THE BOUNDS OF
id. PERMISSABLE CROSS-EXAMINATION.
0,1

:al

The District Attorney, when cross-examining the
Appellant, exceeded the scope of permissable cross-examination by asking questions which assumed facts not
bt in evidence and further by asking questions which were
~X· compounded and argumentative.
rn

on

The District Attorney, by the use of questions which
In· exceeded the scope of direction examination and based
iO. upon facts not in evidence, put to the jury his theory of
in the case. Such cross-examination can be found in the
et, transcript commencing at page 1683. Defense counsel
objected to the questioning and a conference was conVI· ducted out of the presence of the jury by an alarmed
1er judge who tried to limit and give objectivity to the District Attorney's questioning. ( T 1707-1708)

Jb·

~~

ea
on

Ill'

Finally, defense counsel asked that the record refleet his continuing objection ( T 1721). During the
course of cross-examination, defense counsel, on no less
than seven occasions, ( T 1689, 1716, 1719, 1721, 1722,
1727, 1729) made objections to the District Attorney's
questions which were each and all overruled, serving to
impress upon the jury that the questions propounded by
the State's counsel were acceptable and the objections
interposed by a protective defense attorney were to permit recuperative analysis by a guilty witness.

9

A novice at trying criminal cases realizes the pro\1.
lems of int.erp~sing objections to a State's Attorney'11
cross-exammation ..Most reason, unless the abuse is fla.i
grant, that it appears to a jury that you are aiding or
hiding a guilty witness and as a matter of strategy, little
objecting tactically is appropriate. It was this rationalt
that forced defense counsel to have the record reflect
his continuing objection and then sit patiently while the I
abuse continued.

1

1

1

I

A criminal defendant goes upon the stand under,
cloud. He stands charged with a criminal offense and i1
under the strongest possible temptation to give evidenct
favorable to himself. His evidence is therefore lookeal
upon with suspicion and distrust and if, in addition le:
this, he may be subjected to cross-examination as Appel·f
lant here was, he became so prejudiced in the minds oli
the jury as to induce them to convict upon statement- 1
made in the course of cross-examination, called questiom
and not upon evidence. It is not legitimate cross-exam1·1
nation to advance theories or bolster a weak case on spec I
ulative and conjectural statements and then call then:I
I
questions.
I

The cold record is vacant of the District Attornep
demeanor when cross-examining, but the record doe;
provide these illustrative samples:
And when you took her there, and I mean Arn.
Levanger, on that day, you had her put her bea~
down in the seat when you went through town( T 1706 lines 17-19)
10

And at that same time in that same place, October 10, 1969, between 7 :00 and 9 :00 p.m. you
took States Exhibit 16, your topcoat, and you
laid ihat on that sofa, didn't you? ( T 1716 lines
1-4)

And maybe that's the time that you got your
sweater on the window sill because maybe when
she came back and hit you with her head, as you
were choking the life out of her, you fell on that
window sill and got your sweater on it, maybe
that is when it happened. (T 1719 lines 14-18)
So you got her around this way (indicating) and
picked her up and stepped backwards through
the window and when you did that, isn't it a fact( T 1721 lines 4-6)
All right. Now, isn't it a fact that you couldn't
leave that body of Ann Levanger at your grandmother's house because they would connect it
with you? ( T 1723 lines 13-15)
Isn't it a fact that because you got worried about
sliding into that gully and because your transmission was giving you trouble that you decided
you wouldn't go all the way up to the shaft and
hide that girl's body in the shaft, so you took it
out and put it in the sagebrush where it was
found, isn't that a fact? ( T 1724, 1725 lines 27-2)
I show you what has been marked State's Exhibit
26 in this matter and received in evidence as a
stick that was in the ligature around that girl's
neck, and isn't it a fact that after you took her out
of the car in the area that the body was found that
then and there you put that stick in there because
you wanted to be certain that the job was done?
( T 1725 lines 24-30)
No where in the record does the truth of these assumed
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facts appear. The only mention of them is in the quei
tions asked by the District Attorney and there, they wer1
stated as matters of fact. Furthermore, neither proui
nor offer of proof of such facts was made by the counst'
for the State. From all that appears in the record, th1
statements well might have been entirely a fiction ot
counsel's imagination.
I

Justice Peek of the District Court of Appeal of thti
.
I
Third District for California, in ilf cDonald vs. Price:
181 P2d 115, 80 CA2d 150 ( 1947), states the ruleail
follows:
:
I

While a wide latitude should be given in cros1·!
examinations, counsel in putting questions to thtj
witness should not be allowed to assume facts no!;
in evidence and state as positive assertions fact
which if true would be detrimental to the oppos·,
ing party's case and of such a nature as to inflame'
and prejudice the minds of the jurors .... The,
inherent vice of the matter lies in the attempt to
bring before the jury in a round about way facti
which could not be proved and which from a~:
appearances may have been entirely false.
1

See also Buchanan vs. Nye, 128 CA2 582, 275 P2Ji
767 ( 1954), and this comment by the Oklahoma Court:
of Criminal Appeals in State vs. Davis 413 P2d 92~.
( 1966) referring to its prior holding in Leeth vs. State.I
94 Okla Cr. 61, 230 P2d 942,
'
It is improper for the County Atto~ney ~o state,
his personal opinion as to defendants gmlt or.t~
state facts not proved by evidence or otherw1st
given before the jury, and ~vhich amounts .to hi:
own opinion ... the only evidence offered m thi.
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respect was that provided by the County Attorney in the process of his cross-examination, which
in substance amounted to his opinion.
l is Appellant's contention that the State's Attorney's procedure in his cross-examination of Appellant
riolated Appellant's fundamental rights. The trial judge
made one effort to stop and limit the cross-examination,
but the trial court should have gone beyond such admonition. See State vs. Bouse, 199 Or 676, 264 P2d 800
(1953) ·where the Oregon Supreme Court said" ... The
Court itself, in the intere,As of justice, should have taken
action to stop it."

The record in this case has improper, argumentative, and prejudicial questions assuming unproved facts
asked by counsel for the State on cross-examination of
Appellant-questions to which objections should have
been sustained and stricken and the jury instructed to
disregard them.
POINT III

THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AD-

MITTING INTO EVIDENCE ITEMS SEIZED
FROM APPELLANT'S AUTOMOBILE.

'l'he trial counsel entered into a stipulation of fact
relative to the manner in which the automobile was seized,
the essence of which is found at T. P. 340-344.
Historicallv
. , an item could be seized pursuant to a
ralid warrant or incidental to a lawful arrest. Quite

13
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apart from an arrest to justify a seizure without a war
rant the State could secure the item by the consent of tn1
party from whom it was seized. However, the consenr.
must be given without express or implied duress. Tn1'
State must never exceed the bounds of consent. In sud
case there is no valid consent.
I
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruleu
that consent to enter one's premises induced by mistakt
or deception as to the police agents identity was not valia
consent. Gould vs. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
The Court said as follows:
The secret taking without force from the house or
office of one suspected of crime and in his aO·
sence of a paper belonging to him, having evi·
dential value only by a representative of an:
branch or subdivision of the Federal Governmeui
violates the Constitutional guarantee against un·
reasonable searches and seizures whether entrancr
to such house or office be obtained by stealth or
through social acquaintance of in the guise of a
business call and whether the owner or not ~
present at the time of entry.
In Gould, supra, the seizure was under direction 01
a superior officer, as was the officer who obtained ilir
appellant's car. The car would not have been obtaineil
but for the deceit of the officer.
The case law in this area appears limited but tht
United States Supreme Court in Lewis vs. Unitel
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), a more recent pronounce·
ment would have struck down the search had the agent
'

14

by his deceit acquired anything not contemplated by the

appellant.

It appears that the government in this case secured
the consent of appellant through deception which is no
consent at all and an unconstitutional trespass.
It is interesting to note that the State did not have

probable cause to seize the car until after the analysis of
its content. Probable cause to seize must exist prior to
the seizure and not be a justification for a seizure already
made.
Appellant's auto was not validly seized and any seizure was nonconsensual because of deception. The State
should be denied use of such evidence and the appellant's
motion to suppress should have been granted.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE SELECTION OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS BY:
(A) DISMISSING ONE JUROR ON ITS OWN
:\IOTION FOR A CAUSE NOT FOUND IN THE
UTAH STATUTES, AND (B) BY WRONGFULLY EXCLUDING A JUROR FROM THE
PANEL, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE APPELLANT OF THE IMPARTIAL JURY REQUIRED BY T H E S IX TH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.

15

Section 77 -30-16, Utah Code Annotated ( 195~
sets forth the challenges which may be exercised at tli1
selection of a jury. That section celarly states that a cha!
lenge for cause may be taken by either party ( empha~c
added). Further, that Section of the Utah statutes di
vides the challenges for cause into general and particu
lar challegnes. Section 77-30-18, Utah Code Annotate(
( 1953) sets forth the particular grounds for challenge
which are of two kinds: when the juror is shown to Oi
biased or, when he is shown to be partial.

In Volume I, page 160 of the transcript, on line I:
the Court stated:

The Court is of the opinion, in view of the la~
answer and statement of Mr. Knotts, that hi
could not and would not under any circumstance
return a verdict of the death penalty, recommend
ing the death penalty, that he should be excuser
as a juror in this case. That will be the order an1
the clerk will draw another juror. Mr. Knott!
you will be excused from further service in thi
case.

Counsel for the defense objected to the Court's dismis1
ing l\fr. Knotts on its own motion. Transcript, Volum
I, page 160, line 24:

For the record, I wonder if we might enter a
objection to Mr. Knotts being excused on behal
of°the defense, that no challenges were made. ~n
Court: Yes, the record will show your objectioJ

While it is the generally accepted rule that the CoUI
in selecting the veniremen sits as a tryer of fact on issui
of challenges, See, e.g., State vs. JVilliams, 182 Kai

16

'

322 P .2d 726 ( 1958), our code does not give the
tn1 Court the right to challenge on its own motion, nor does
al\ the inherent power of the Court in selecting the venire1sc! extend to those lengths. The statute as quoted above
dii~rovides that a challenge for cause may be made by
~u 1 either party, and the statutes as quoted above indicate
:eel the grounds on which such challenges may be based.
5ei Therefore, the Court in acting on its own motion vioIJtl lated Appellant's right to a fair and impartial selection
of a jury guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and the
i/ Ctah statutes.
i~[ J68,
1

1

1

The transcript reveals in Volume I, pages 159 and

ait 160, that the Court went to considerable lengths to dis-

with the prospective juror Knotts whether or not
ce! }fr. Knotts could recommend a death penalty. Section
:d;jn-30-19, Utah Code Annotated (7953) subsection 9
,eu,
no[ )(ates:
ht cuss

tt1.i

hiil

,

II

ISl·I

If the offense charged is punishable with death,
the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as
would preclude his finding the defendant guilty;

1

would be the basis for a challenge for cause. That statutory subsection on close scrutiny provides a basis for
a challenge for cause only when the conscientious
an
u scruples prohibit the prospective juror from deciding
13
[b1 the issue of guilt or innocence. This question was not
on asked of Mr. Knotts by the Court, nor was the informaun lion volunteered. Rather, the Court questioned only
uB 1rhether or not Mr. Knotts could bring in a death penan I alty• recommendation. The inability to recommend a

m1

'

17

sentence of death is not a ground for a challenge fo. ,
cause in the State of Utah.
The legislature has clearly designed the challeng~
for cause in section 77-30-19 Utah Code Annotate,,
( 1953) so as to guarantee the selection of unbiased an~I
impartial jurors. The legislature did not attempt, how.'i
ever, to exclude those jurors whose tendency would 01 1
toward lenient treatment of one convicted of a crime.
The Court, in acting as it did in this case, engrafte~
by judicial act the requirement that prospective juror1
with a lenient attitude on sentencing be excluded. Tnr
systematic denial of lenient jurors as practiced by tbr
Court in the case of prospective juror Knotts, clear!)
denied the Appellant his constitutional right of due
process. A juror may be excluded only for bias or par·•,
tiality, not for attitudes of leniency. Thus, the Courlj
may have, by excluding .Mr. Knotts, excluded the one
individual who would have saved Redford from a dealt
penalty sentence. That this possibility may have oc·,
curred requires that the matter be remanded for a new\
trial with a properly selected jury.
I
The Court's improper exclusion of the juror Knott
using as a reason Knotts' confessed inability to recom·
mend a death sentence, invalidated the entire panel ol
ventiremen. Although the jurisdictions are not in accorJ.,
Appellant submits the basic principle of Witherspoon
vs. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, (1970) was violated by the
witness Knotts exclusion.
In Marion vs. Beto, 434 F2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970)
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit treated a
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case similar to one at bar. In that case, the Texas
, prisoner appealed a denial of habeas corpus relief main:~ latning that the trial court excluded jurors who voiced
eu, conscientious scruples against the death penalty. The
n~II Court noted that the bare question to be decided was
11·1 whether the improper exclusion for cause of a relao:I tively small number of the total number of veniremen
k questioned on grounds of mere conscientious scruples
e~ against the death penalty, deprived the defendant of
1r1 the impartial jury required by the sixth and fourteenth
ne amendments. In Marion, the Court examined some of
hr the cases which have held that an improper exclusion
·I) of a few jurors does not constitute a violation of the
ue Witherspoon doctrine. See, e.g., Bell vs. Patterson, 402
tr·: F2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968); Pittman vs. State, 434 SW
ITlj 352; Scott V8. State, 434 SW2d 678.
ne
The Court then concluded that the "magnitude of
It a decision to take a human life" was so great * * *
fo:

IC·

~ \'

1

1

:t

D·

ol
J.,

It really does not follow that the improper exclusion of a relatively small number of the total
veniremen examined does not prejudice the defendant's right to an impartial cross section of
the community.

The Court further stated:
\Vhere, as here, unanimity of decision is required
to impose the death sentence, stark reality is that
one improperly excluded juror may mean the
difference between life or death for a defendant.

The Marion case was reversed and remanded to
the District Court, State of Texas, with the options to
a either resentence the defendant to a sentence not to

J,1

I

19

exceed life or to vacate the Appellant's conviction a
sentence, and retry him.
The Appellant submits that the improper exclusio
of Mr. Knotts operated as a substantial prejudice agai
him and tainted the entire panel. Although a proper!
impaneled jury could still return a <leath penalty, ,
exclusion of even one juror is prejudical in a capit
case. On this ground, Appellant urges that his con~~
tion be reversed and that the case be sent back to
District Court for a new trial with a properly select
JUry.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant requests a reversal of the judgment
and verdict rendered below and the granting of a ne1
trial on the grounds heretofore set forth. That the A~
pellant was denied a fair tial, resulting in the jury1
granting him the death penalty because of the exclusio~
of a juror who had conscientious scruples against ~1
death penalty; for the admission of highly prejudiciru
evidence, that is, the testimony of Linda I vie; the eii·
dence improperly obtained from Appellant's vehicle;
and the manner in which Appellant was subjected to
cross-examination.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT YAN SCIYER
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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